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Abstract: The impact of quality on the demand facing health care providers has important
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1 Introduction
Asymmetric information between physicians and their patients is a basic characteristic
of the market for health care services. In the words of Arrow (1963):
“...medical knowledge is so complicated, the information possessed by the physician
as to the consequences and possibilities of treatment is necessarily very much greater
than that of the patient, or at least so it is believed by both parties”.
Patients are therefore often considered to be poor judges of service quality. However,
those who have repeated encounters with the same health care provider, will accumulate
information on services and treatment outcomes, thus narrowing the information gap.
The market for general practitioners’ services is characterized by durable doctor-patient
relations that may improve the patients’ quality assessment. The aim of this paper is to
investigate empirically whether the demand facing a general practitioner (GP) responds
to the quality of the provided services.
General background
The impact of quality on the demand facing health care providers has important im-
plications for the organization of health care markets. There is a growing literature on
competition and quality in such markets, from which an important result is that the
effect of stronger competition on quality depends crucially on the relative sizes of the
price elasticity and the quality elasticity of demand. More competition may bring about
reductions in quality if the quality elasticity is small compared to the price elasticity
(Dranove and Satterthwaite, 2000, Gaynor, 2006). Further, the impact of quality on the
demand facing health care providers has important implications for the optimal design of
payment systems. A familiar result is that a retrospective payment scheme in the form of
cost reimbursement is likely to pursue the goal of quality provision while giving weak in-
centives to provide cost reducing efforts. Conversely, prospective payment schemes tend
to strengthen the incentives for cost reduction, while weakening the incentives for provid-
ing quality. A combination of payment mechanisms is thus likely to perform better than
payment systems employing only one parameter. However, if quality affects demand, a
first-best solution can, in theory, be obtained under a pure prospective payment scheme
(Ma, 1994). This suggests that the effect of quality on demand – and information on its
numerical size – is a key factor determining the optimal calibration of the parameters in
the payment system: If the market punishes providers who are skimping on quality, the
payment system can put more weight on the parameters that encourage cost reducing
efforts.
Relation to literature
A conventional empirical approach when seeking to assess the effect of quality on demand
for health services is to estimate the effect of provider characteristics on individual con-
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sumers’ choice of provider, applying different models for individuals’ discrete choice. An
influential paper in this tradition is Luft et al. (1990). They specifically study the effect
of quality indicators such as death and complication rates, teaching status of hospital,
and out of state admissions on patients’ choice of hospital, using logit models, and find
positive effects for several of the applied indicators. Using similar quality indicators and
methods, Burns and Wholey (1992) extend the framework by including in their logit
models characteristics of the admitting physician. They find that quality affects demand
positively, and that characteristics of the admitting physician are important determinants
of patients’ hospital choice. More recently, Howard (2005), applying a mixed logit model
on data on kidney transplantations, estimated the effect of the deviation from expected
failure rate on probabilities of hospital choice. The results indicate that hospitals with
a higher than expected failure rate have smaller probabilities for being chosen. A differ-
ent empirical strategy is followed in Chirikos (1992), in estimating, by linear regression,
the effect of individual hospitals’ quality spending on their market shares. The results
support the hypothesis that increased provider quality affects demand positively.
The present paper adds to the literature in several ways. First, no previous empirical
studies seem to have considered the demand effects of quality in the market for general
practitioners. Second, in the current literature the relationship between demand and
various indicators of quality, such as mortality rates, failure rates or hospital type, and
other independent variables, are estimated separately. The present paper contributes to
the literature by simultaneously estimating the relationship between demand and several
quality indicators, applying linear structural equation modeling (LISREL) and estimation
methods. Within this framework we acknowledge both the multidimensional aspect of the
quality concept, and that it may be considered as more appropriate to interpret outcome
measures such as mortality rates or failure rates as functions of quality, rather than as
measuring quality itself. Third, our econometric model has a wider field of application
as it provides a method to separate the effect of quality on outcome measures from the
effect of patient health.
Setting of the study
In June 2001 a regular GP scheme was introduced in Norwegian general practice, making
the GPs responsible for the provision of primary care services to the persons listed at
their practice. Prior to the reform the health authorities gathered the information needed
to assign one GP to each Norwegian inhabitant. All inhabitants were asked to rank their
three most preferred GPs in a form, and all GPs were asked to report the maximum
number of patients they would like to take care of. An algorithm was designed to utilize
this information and obtain a one-to-one match between inhabitants and GPs.
Our data set has a panel format with the GP as the observation unit, but for some
variables only one observation per GP exists. The data stem from The Norwegian General
Practitioners Database, covering all Norwegian GPs, supplemented by measures of the
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GP density in each municipality and of age-gender specific mortality rates. Among
the variables recorded are the number of persons who ranked each GP as most preferred
when returning the entry form, the number of mortalities among each GP’s listed patients
during a six-month period, and the proportion of the listed persons who switch to other
GPs in later periods. For a stratified sample of GPs, relating to 14 municipalities, from
this official GP database the data set has been extended to also include the median income
and wealth of the listed persons and the proportion of them who have not finished high-
school. In the analysis, we interpret the number of first-rankings and the proportion of
listed persons who switch to other GPs, as indicators of the demand facing each GP.
Our main hypothesis is that there exists a latent stochastic variable, denoted as GP
quality, which, when heterogeneity related to the health status of the listed persons and
other observed heterogeneity have been accounted for, is positively related to the demand
facing each individual GP and negatively related to the recorded excess mortality of the
GP’s listed patients. We find empirical support to this hypothesis.
Two kinds of models are considered: a Panel Data model with latent heterogeneity
related to perceived GP quality and a multi-equation LISREL type of model, including
both GP quality and the health of the stock of persons on the GP’s list as latent variables,
both of which are assumed to affect demand as well as other observed variables. For some
variables, including the proportion of persons switching and the excess mortality, we have
data in the panel data format. This is profitable for quantifying the latent heterogeneity
and its consequences.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The modeling of the demand in the market
for GPs is discussed in the following two sections. In Section 2, we present a theoretical
argument supporting the view that the expected demand facing each individual GP
can be a function of quality, even if the true quality is unobserved to his/her potential
patients. The discussion motivates testable predictions and hypotheses to be examined in
the paper. In Section 3, we present the two econometric models. The data are described
in Section 4, while estimation and test results are presented in Section 5. In Section 6
we discuss the results and conclude.
2 A model of patients’ quality perceptions
and demand for GPs
Quality and demand
In order to model the consumers’ choice of GP when they are unable to observe the
true quality of GP services, we first show that if the errors in the quality assessment of
potential patients have certain properties, the demand for GPs will depend on quality
even when the latter is unobservable. Consumers are imperfectly informed about the
quality of GPs and we therefore distinguish between true and perceived quality. We
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assume that the only criterion for selecting a GP is the perceived quality of the services
provided. Quality of health care services is a complex entity that is not easily represented
by a scalar measure. In this model, however, quality can (in principle) be quantified and
completely described by a number on a finite scale. One may thus think of quality as
an input factor in the GP’s ‘health production function’. While predetermined abilities,
such as individual talent, obviously influence quality, the GP also has discretionary power
to influence quality by the exertion of ‘quality generating efforts’, such as concentration.
The individual GP’s quality of services is determined by his/her abilities and preferences
and we assume that the latter are both time invariant, implying that quality also is time
invariant.
The consumer’s information set is comprised by quantitative information on the qual-
ity of each available GP. This information, however, is ‘contaminated’ by stochastic errors.
The quality of GPs as perceived by a consumer may be higher or lower than the true
quality, and two consumers are likely to have different beliefs regarding the quality of
the same GP. The stochastic properties of what we may think of as measurement er-
rors drive the matching of consumers and GPs in the model. Let µj denote the true
quality of GP j (j = 1, . . . ,M), while qij denotes the quality of GP j as perceived by
consumer i (i = 1, . . . , N). We assume that qij is normally distributed with E(qij) = µj
and var(qij) = σ2j , i.e., the distribution of the perceived quality differs between GPs. We
thus allow for the possibility that the population of consumers may have more accurate
information about GPs who have been active in the market for a long time (low σ2j ) com-
pared to GPs who have established their practice recently (high σ2j ). We let uij = qij−µj
and assume that the MN uijs are uncorrelated both across GPs and over consumers.
Altogether, we can therefore state our assumptions as
(1)
qij = µj + uij ,
uij ∼ N(0, σ2j ), E(uijulk) = 0, i 6= l or j 6= k,
i, l = 1, . . . , N,
j, k = 1, . . . ,M.
We simply assume that consumer i considers perceived quality qij as indicating the
true quality of GP j. Since the normal distribution has an infinite support, the distri-
bution of perceived qualities associated with the GPs with the highest and the lowest
true quality overlap. This ensures that even if µj < µk, there is a positive probability
that qij>qik, so that any GP has a strictly positive probability of being selected by any
consumer. This implication seems reasonable if the differences in true quality is not too
large.
Matching GPs and consumers
We may think of the matching of GPs and consumers as a lottery. A draw is a realization
of qi1, qi2, . . . , qiM , that is, the realizations of the beliefs of the quality of each and one
of the GPs for consumer i. There are thus N independent drawings performed in the
market, one for each consumer. Let φ(qij ;µj , σ2j ) denote the density function of qij , the
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perceived quality of GP j, which according to (1) is distributed as N(µj , σ2j ). To simplify
notation we let ∆ijk = qij − qik be the difference between consumer i’s perceived quality
of GPs j and k. It follows from (1) that ∆ijk ∼ N(νjk, θ2jk), with density function
φ(∆ijk; νjk, θ2jk), where
(2) νjk = µj−µk, θ2jk = σ2j + σ2k, j, k = 1, . . . ,M.
Let Ajk denote the event that ∆ijk > 0 for an arbitrary consumer, i. Then
(3) P (Ajk) = P (∆ijk > 0) =
∫∞
0 φ(∆ijk; νjk, θ
2
jk)d∆ijk ≡ pjk
is the probability that GP j has a higher perceived quality than GP k. Since the draws
are assumed to be independent, the event that GP j has the highest perceived quality in
a random draw can thus be expressed as
Bj=
M⋂
k=1
k 6=j
Ajk, j=1, . . . ,M.
The probability of this event can be expressed as:
(4) P (Bj) = P (∆ijk>0; ∀k 6=j)=
M∏
k=1
k 6=j
pjk ≡ pij , j=1, . . . ,M.
The probability that GP j has the highest perceived quality in a draw, pij , is a function of
µ1, . . . , µM ; σ21, . . . , σ
2
M . Since (3) implies that ∂ pjk/∂νjk > 0 ∀ j 6= k, it follows from (2)
and (4) that ∂pij/∂µj > 0 and ∂pij/∂µk < 0, k 6= j. Hence, for all GPs, the probability
of being selected by any consumer is an increasing function of the true quality. When
consumers select the GP with the highest perceived quality, the expected demand facing
GP j is pijN . The expected demand facing any GP therefore changes in proportion to
the number of consumers in the market. Or stated otherwise, the probability of being
selected by a random consumer can be interpreted as the GP’s expected market share.
The ex-post market share converges to the probability of being selected by a random
consumer as the number of drawings increases.
From this model we can make the following predictions:
[P1] GPs with high quality of services have a higher probability of being selected by a randomly
chosen consumer than a GP whose services are of lower quality.
[P2] The selection probabilities pij are independent of the number of consumers, N . For a given
population of M GPs, expected demand for the services of any of them, is a linear function of N .
This, rather simple, model implies that the consumers are unable to affect the preci-
sion of their own quality assessment, reflected by the assumption that perceived quality
of GP j has the same variance, σ2j , for all consumers. The model could be generalized
to allow for consumer heterogeneity in the sense that some are more skillful or eager in
gathering and processing information in the market than others. This could have been
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accounted for by replacing σ2j by σ
2
ij , where σ
2
ij <σ
2
hj if consumer i has taken efforts to
become better informed about GP j’s quality than has consumer h. A prediction from
such an extended model may be that high-quality GPs tend to have a higher proportion
of skilled or eager consumers on their lists than the low-quality GPs (Godager, 2008).
The possible existence of such a selection mechanism is important since consumers who
are skilled or eager in collecting information, may have a health status and a death
probability different from those not so skilled or eager.
The crucial question then becomes: which groups of consumers, according to ob-
servable characteristics, devote most attention and efforts in searching for the best GP?
On the one hand, less healthy consumers, with a high expected mortality rate, may be
thought to be particularly concerned about their choice of GP and as a result be more
willing to collect information than the average consumer. This may contribute to in-
creasing the average mortality rate among the patients listed with high-quality GPs. On
the other hand, consumers who are more healthy and resourceful and have low expected
mortality may be particularly able to collect and process such information. This may
contribute to the outcome of the selection mechanism being reversed, i.e., lowering the
average mortality rates of the persons listed with high-quality GPs. Consequently, from
a priori reasoning it is not obvious that the outcome of (observed or unobserved) pa-
tient heterogeneity will be neither that high-quality GPs attract patients with an average
health status which differs from that of the low-quality GPs, nor if there is a difference, in
which direction it will go. If a mechanism systematically selecting patients with different
expected mortality rates for GPs of different professional quality is at work, and hetero-
geneity in health status among listed patients is not taken care of in our modelling, we
are likely to face severe difficulties when trying to estimate the impact on demand of GP
service quality. The models to be described below have different degree of sophistication
and are not equally well designed to meet this challenge. We address this issue in more
detail in sections 3 and 5.
In elaborating the theory element above, we, for simplicity, have considered the con-
sumers’ mean perceived quality of GP j, µj , as non-stochastic. This interpretation is
provisional and intended to be valid only in a conditional sense. When, in the following,
this theory element will be embedded in an econometric model involving both latent and
observed variables related to GP quality, this variable will change its status and become
a latent, stochastic variable.
3 Econometric models
Motivation
In order to represent, and hopefully quantify, how the demand for GP services responds
to GP quality and other relevant variables – as motivated by the theoretical argument put
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forth in the previous section – two kinds of models will be considered. The first,Model A,
is a two-equation Panel Data model accounting for latent unit-specific heterogeneity. We
associate the latter with, inter alia, perceived GP quality. The second, Model B, is a
more complex, multi-equation model of the LISREL type. It includes not only GP quality
among its latent variables, but also the initial health status of the persons entered on the
GPs’ lists. This extension serves to control for the fact that GP quality and observed GP
heterogeneity may interact with observed and latent heterogeneity of the listed persons
in multiple ways when determining demand as observed in the market.
Model A: Two-equation panel data random effects regression model
Assume that, in a certain district, at time t, there areMt GPs, indexed by, j = 1, . . . ,Mt,
and Nt patients, indexed by i = 1, . . . , Nt. As before, we let µj denote the true quality of
GP j, unobserved both to the consumers and the health administrators, and now treated
as stochastic. Let further y1jt and y2jt denote two observable variables, which may be
considered indicators of µj at time t. The interpretation adopted in Model A is that y1jt
is the demand facing GP j, and y2jt is the excess death rate of persons on the list of
this GP at time t. We specifically measure demand only by the number of consumers
ranking the GP as the most strongly preferred prior to the implementation of the regular
GP reform, and it is observed in period t = 1 only. The variables assumed to explain
(y1j1, y2jt) are quality and observable variables, of which some vary across both GPs and
time periods, denoted as two-dimensional variables, and some are GP-specific.
We specify
y1j1 = x1j1β1 + z1jγ1 + α1j + u1j1, j = 1, . . . ,M1,
y2jt = x2jtβ2 + z2jγ2 + α2j + u2jt, j = 1, . . . ,Mt; t = 1, . . . , T,
(5) ([
u1j1
u2jt
]
|
|
[
x1j1, z1j , α1j
x2jt, z2j , α2j
])
∼ IID(0,Σ), 0 =
[
0
0
]
, Σ =
[
σu1u1 σu1u2
σu1u2 σu2u2
]
,(6)
where (x1j1,x2jt) and (z1j , z2j) are the row vectors of two-dimensional and GP-specific
variables, respectively, β1,γ1,β2,γ2 are column vectors of coefficients, and (α1j , α2j) are
stochastic latent variables relating to the GP j’s quality, the latter assumed to affect
patients’ demand as well as their mortality. A crucial part of the model are the equa-
tions which connect these latent variables with the latent quality µj . We consider two
ways of formalizing this relationship stochastically, denoted as Versions 1 and 2. In both
versions, parallel with the extended scope of the model, the statistical status of µj will
be changed from being a deterministic expectation, interpreted conditionally, to being a
latent stochastic variable, the distribution of which is specified as part of the econometric
panel data model.
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Latent heterogeneity. Version 1: We first specify
α1j = λ1µj + ε1j ,
α2j = λ2µj + ε2j ,
(7)  µjε1j
ε2j
 ||
|
[
x1j1,z1j
x2jt, z2j
] ∼ IID(0,Ω), 0 =
 00
0
 , Ω = [σ2µ 0 00 σε1ε1 σε1ε2
0 σε2ε1 σε2ε2
]
,(8)
where we expect λ1>0, λ2<0, and σε1ε2 = σε2ε1 < 0. When µj is low, i.e., when GP j is
a low-quality doctor, then his/her patients will have a higher mortality rate than can be
explained by (x2jt, z2j), and he/she will meet a lower demand than can be explained by
(x1j1, z1j). Equations (5) and (7) define a four-equation system of structural equations
explaining (y1j1, y2jt, α1j , α2j) by (x1j1,x2jt, z1j , z2j , µj) and noise terms. Inserting (7)
into (5) yields the reduced form
(9)
y1j1 = x1j1β1 + z1jγ1 + λ1µj + ε1j + u1j1, j = 1, . . . ,M1,
y2jt = x2jtβ2 + z2jγ2 + λ2µj + ε2j + u2jt, j = 1, . . . ,Mt; t = 1, . . . , T,
Latent heterogeneity. Version 2: The alternative version is
α1j = λα2j + εj ,(10) ([
α2j
εj
]
|
|
[
x1j1, z1j
x2jt, z2j
])
∼ IID
([
0
0
]
,
[
σ2α2 0
0 σ2ε
])
,(11)
where we expect λ<0. Equations (5) and (10) define a three-equation system of structural
equations which explains (y1j1, y2jt, α1j) by (x1j1,x2jt, z1j , z2j , α2j) and noise terms. In-
serting (10) into (5) we get, instead of (9), the reduced form
(12)
y1j1 = x1j1β1 + z1jγ1 + λα2j + εj + u1j1, j = 1, . . . ,M1,
y2jt = x2jtβ2 + z2jγ2 + α2j + u2jt, j = 1, . . . ,Mt; t = 1, . . . , T.
The latter equations, with λ = λ1/λ2 and εj = ε1j − λε2j , could, of course, alternatively
have been derived from (5) and (7). However, when (8) holds, (12) is not a reduced form,
since α2j is correlated with ε2j and therefore with the composite disturbance in the cross
section equation in (12), εj + u1j1.
The basic differences between the two model versions can be explained as follows:
First, it follows from (7) and (8) that Version 1 implies
(13) E
[ α21j α1jα2j
α2jα1j α
2
2j
] |
|
|
[
x1j1, z1j
x2jt, z2j
] = [ λ21σ2µ + σε1ε1 λ1λ2σ2µ + σε1ε2
λ2λ1σ
2
µ + σε2ε1 λ
2
2σ
2
µ + σε2ε2
]
,
and cov(αij , εkj) = σεiεk (i = 1, 2; k = 1, 2), which violate (10)–(11). Second, while
Version 1 treats latent quality µj as a symmetric ‘causal factor’ for y1j1 and y2jt, Version 2,
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by treating α2j as the latent causal factor, introduces an asymmetry in the way quality
affects latent GP-specific heterogeneity in the two equations in (12).
The empirical implementation of Model A, to be presented in Section 5, relies on
Version 2, in that estimation is done sequentially and a predicted value of α2j obtained
from the second equation in (12), the excess mortality equation, serves as a proxy for
GP quality in the first equation, the demand equation. The estimators used in Section 5
may thus be consistent in Version 2, but inconsistent in Version 1.
Model B: LISREL model with GP quality and patient health latent
Model A gives a rather restrictive, uni-directional description of how demand for GP
services is related to GP quality. A LISREL model, i.e., a linear multi-equation structural
model with both manifest and latent structural variables may be a better solution to the
problem of modeling sample separation. Model B, now to be described, belongs to this
class. See Goldberger (1972), Jo¨reskog (1977), Aigner et al. (1984, Sections 4 and 5),
and Jo¨reskog et al. (2000) for further discussion of LISREL models.
Again, we exploit the panel design of our data set, with the GP as the observational
unit, containing GP-specific time-series for some variables, including patient-switching
and mortality rates, as well as GP-specific and patient specific time invariant variables.
We let t be the time index and suppress the GP subscript. Boldface and slim letters de-
note matrices/vectors and scalars, respectively. Model B has three categories of variables:
observable (manifest) structural variables, latent structural variables, and error/noise
variables. In the baseline version of the model, the categorization of the variables –
corresponding to the standard notation for latent and manifest variables in the LISREL
documentation – is as follows:
Observable (manifest) structural variables:
y1: Number of persons wanting to be entered on list initially, in period 1 (scalar)
y2t: Number of persons switching to another GP in period t (scalar)
x1: Observed GP characteristics initially, in period 1 [(6×1)-vector]
x2: Observed patient characteristics initially, in period 1 [(3×1)-vector]
x3t: Excess mortality of patient stock in period t (scalar)
x4: Other time-invariant GP-characteristics unrelated to GP quality [(2×1)-vector]
y2 ≡ [y21, . . . , y2T ]′
x3 ≡ [x31, . . . , x3T ]′
Latent structural variables:
η1: Demand directed towards GP (latent, time-invariant scalar)
ξ1: GP quality (latent, time-invariant scalar)
ξ2: Patient health (latent, time-invariant scalar)
ξ3 ≡ x4: Technical redefinition1
1 This redefinition is motivated by the fact that LISREL does not allow x variables to affect the η
variables directly in cases where the model also include ξ variables.
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Error/noise variables:
ζ1: Disturbance in demand function
ε1, ε2t: Errors in the measurement equations for demand
δ1: Errors in equations relating GP quality to GP characteristics [(6×1)-vector]
δ2: Errors in equations relating patient health to patient characteristics. [(3×1)-vector]
δ3t: Errors in equations relating patient health and GP quality to excess mortality (scalar)
δ3 ≡ [δ31, . . . , δ3T ]′
ε2 ≡ [ε21, . . . , ε2T ]′
A basic hypothesis of the baseline version of Model B is that GP quality, ξ1, and
patient health status, ξ2, both time invariant scalars, are exogenous to the rest of the
system. The quality variable ξ1 corresponds to the variable µj in Model A, Version 1.
Time invariance and exogeneity are also assumed for the time invariant GP character-
istics, x4= ξ3, in the model represented by the gender and the country of origin of the
GP; see below. These four variables are considered as determined from outside, inher-
ent in the GP and in the patient, and hence are not subject to feedback from the rest
of the system. This is an important assumption, which, for at least ξ1 and ξ2, may
be questioned. To some extent it will be modified later on (Section 5), in examining
the robustness of the primary conclusions concerning the link between GP quality and
patient demand to changes in basic assumptions. These genuinely exogenous variables
are, in the baseline model, indicated by observable ‘counterparts’, which, by assumption,
become endogenous.
The baseline model has four elements: (i) a demand function for GP services expressed
in terms of latent variables, (ii) measurement equations indicating this latent demand,
(iii) measurement equations indicating GP quality and health status of listed persons, and
(iv) distributional assumptions for the latent exogenous variables and the error terms.
First, the baseline version of the demand function, relating latent demand (endoge-
nous) to GP quality (exogenous), and latent health status and other characteristics of
the listed persons (all exogenous), is:
(14) η1 = Γ11ξ1 + Γ12ξ2 + Γ13ξ3 + ζ1 = [ Γ11 Γ12 Γ13 ]
 ξ1ξ2
ξ3
+ ζ1.
We can interpret Γ11,Γ12,Γ13 as (vectors of) structural coefficients and ζ1 as a distur-
bance.
Second, the baseline version of the measurement system for latent demand is
(15)
[
y1
y2
]
=
[
ΛY 11
ΛY 21
]
η1 +
[
ε1
ε2
]
.
This subsystem expresses that y1,y21, . . . ,y2T are treated as T+1 observable indicators
of the latent demand for GP services. Technically, in factor-analytic terminology, we
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can interpret ΛY 11 and ΛY 21 as factor loadings for, respectively, the number of persons
wanting to be on the list initially (positive loading) and the number of persons switching
to another GP in a later period (negative loading), on latent demand. In standard
regression terminology, we can interpret ΛY 11 and ΛY 21 as the marginal effects of the
latent variables on the corresponding observable variables. The error terms (ε1, ε2) may
contain, inter alia, measurement errors. Third, the baseline version of the measurement
system for GP quality and patient health is specified as
(16)

x1
x2
x3
x4
 =

ΛX11 0 0
0 ΛX22 0
ΛX31 ΛX32 0
0 0 I

 ξ1ξ2
ξ3
+

δ1
δ2
δ3
0
 .
This subsystem expresses, that the vector of observed GP characteristics, x1, is related
to latent GP quality, that the vector of observed patient characteristics is related to
latent patient health, and that the T vector of excess mortalities, x3, is related to both
GP quality and patient health. Technically, in factor-analytic terminology, ΛX11,ΛX31
can be interpreted as, respectively, factor loadings for GP characteristics and excess
patient mortality on latent GP quality. Likewise, ΛX22,ΛX32 can be interpreted as
factor loadings for, respectively, patient characteristics and excess patient mortality on
patient health. The error terms (δ1, δ2, δ3) may, contain, inter alia, measurement errors.
The fourth equation in this sub-system simply states x4 = ξ3, which implies, inter alia,
that these variables, representing observed heterogeneity of the GPs, are assumed to be
error-free.
Fourth, the process determining the latent exogenous variables ξ1, ξ2, ξ3 is modeled
in terms of their first-order and second-order moments as follows:
(17) E
 ξ1ξ2
ξ3
 =
 µξ1µξ2
µξ3
 , V
 ξ1ξ2
ξ3
 =
 Φ11 Φ12 Φ13Φ21 Φ22 Φ23
Φ31 Φ32 Φ33
 ,
while the distributions of the error and noise terms are assumed to satisfy
E[ζ1] = 0, V[ζ1] = Ψ11,(18)
E
 δ1δ2
δ3
 =
 00
0
 , V
 δ1δ2
δ3
 =
 Θδ11 Θδ12 Θδ13Θδ21 Θδ22 Θδ23
Θδ31 Θδ32 Θδ33
 ,(19)
E
[
ε1
ε2
]
=
[
0
0
]
, V
[
ε1
ε2
]
=
[
Θε11 Θε12
Θε21 Θε22
]
,(20)
[
ξ1
ξ2
]
⊥ ζ1 ⊥
[
δ1
δ2
]
⊥
[
ε1
ε2
]
.(21)
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The final assumption, (21), where ⊥ denotes orthogonal, is crucial for the modeling of
causality and non-causality in Model B. It expresses, inter alia, the assumed exogeneity
for GP quality and patient health. Its essence is that these variables, being modeled by
(17), remain unaffected by the perturbations in the demand equation disturbances, and
the errors in the measurement systems for demand (endogenous) and latent GP quality
and latent patient health (exogenous). Since arguments may be raised that this model
disregards a possible effect of GP quality on the listed patients’ initial health status,
we will in addition consider a modified version, Model C, in which this potential link is
modeled and hence may be tested for.
4 Data
Data sources and data design
Prior to the introduction of the regular GP scheme in June 2001, the health authorities
gathered the information needed to assign GPs to the entire Norwegian population. All
inhabitants were asked to rank their three most preferred GPs in an entry form. The
GPs were asked to report the maximum number of patients they would like to take care
of. The health authorities utilized this information as an input in an algorithm allocating
inhabitants to GPs. Most people got listed with the GP whom they had consulted prior
to the reform (Lur˚as, et al., 2003).
Our data stem from The Norwegian General Practitioners Database supplemented
by a measure of the GP density, as calculated from the number of contracted GPs in
each municipality in June 2001, as well as aggregate age/gender specific mortality rates.
The latter are calculated by means of aggregate mortality rates constructed by Statistics
Norway. The Norwegian General Practitioners Database contains information on all
Norwegian GPs, and the variables describing the individual GPs practice is provided
by the National Insurance Administration (NIA) every six month. The database is
administered by the Norwegian Social Science Data Services, who merge the information
reported by NIA with socio-demographic variables as income, wealth and marital status,
registered by statistics Norway. For GPs practicing in 14 municipalities, sampled by
stratification, the database also includes characteristics for the patients who were listed
in the GP’s practice in June 2001, such as the median income and median wealth, and
the proportion who have not finished high-school. For each GP we know the number
of persons who ranked the GP at the top when returning the entry form, in this paper
to be given the interpretation as an indicator of the demand facing the GP. After the
reform was implemented, the GP database is updated at regular intervals to give the
number of persons who are actually listed in the practice. After excluding observations
with key variables missing, our unbalanced panel data set consists of a sample of 484 GPs
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observed up to 7 six-month periods.2 The pattern of observation is described in Table 1,
from which we see that 441, or 91 %, of the GPs are observed in all 7 periods.
Table 1: Pattern of observations
Response pattern No. of GPs Freq., % Cum. freq., %
1111111 441 91.12 91.12
11111 . . 11 2.27 93.39
111111 . 11 2.27 95.66
1111 . . . 8 1.65 97.31
111 . . . . 7 1.45 98.76
11 . . . . . 5 1.03 99.79
11 . . . 11 1 0.21 100.00
· · 484 100.00 · ·
Table 2 lists and defines the variables applied in this paper, Table 3 gives overall
descriptive statistics for the variables, and Table 4 gives descriptive statistics of the GP-
specific means of the time varying variables. Descriptive statistics for variables at the
level of the municipality are given in Table 5. We distinguish between variables observed
at the GP level and variables which are observed at the municipality level and hence are
common to all GPs practising in the same municipality.
The symbols used for the observable variables in the exposition of Models A and B above,
(x,y, z), have their empirical counterparts among the the variables in Table 2. This cor-
respondence is given below (the GP subscript, for simplicity, suppressed):
Model A:
y′1=[DEMAND], y′2t=[ACTMORTt], x′1 is empty, x′2t=[EXPMORTt]
z′1=

GPDENS
MARRIEDGP
SPECGEN
SPECCOM
SPECOTĤALPHA
IMMIGRGP
FEMALEGP
AGEGP
AGEGPSQ

, z′2=

CENTRAL
LESSCENT
LEASTCENT
LOSUBMIT
LOEDUC
PINCOME
PWEALTH
SPECGEN
SPECCOM
SPECOTH
FEMALEGP
AGEGP
AGEGPSQ

2The GPs from the municipality Tromsø, 44 in total, were excluded from the sample. Here, the regular
GP scheme was implemented already in 1993 and very few inhabitants returned the entry form.
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Table 2: Variable definitions
Variable Definition, Type of variable Formula
DEAD No. of dead persons on GP’s list
EXPDEAD No. of persons on GP’s list Expected mortality rates based on
expected to die per year age distribution of persons on list and
population age-specific mortality rates
ACTMORT Actual no. of mortalities per 1000 persons listed =DEAD/LISTSIZE
EXPMORT Expected no. of mortalities per 1000 persons listed =EXPDEAD/LISTSIZE
EXCMORT Excess mortality relative to list size =ACTMORT−EXPMORT
LISTSIZE GP’s actual no. of patients
DEMAND No. of persons ranking this GP as most
preferred when returning entry form
DEMAND1 Demand for this GP normalized against
GP density in municipality =DEMAND*GPDENSITY
AGEGP Age of GP, January 2002
LEAKRATE Share of patients switching to another GP. =no. of persons leaving/LISTSIZE
LOLEAK log(LEAKRATE/(1-LEAKRATE))
FEMALEGP Dummy variable =1 if GP is female
MARRIEDGP Dummy variable =1 if GP is married
IMMIGRGP Dummy variable =1 if GP is non-Scandinavian citizen
SALARY Dummy variable =1 if GP is remunerated by
a fixed salary scheme
SPECGEN Dummy variable =1 if GP is a specialist in
general practice
SPECCOM Dummy variable =1 if GP is a specialist in
community medicine
SPECOTH Dummy variable =1 if GP is a specialist in
other kind of medicine
LEASTCENT Dummy variable =1 if practice in Least central municipality
LESSCENT Dummy variable =1 if practice in Less central municipality
CENTRAL Dummy variable =1 if practice in Central municipality
MOSTCENT Dummy variable =1 if practice in Most central municipality
PINCOME Median income (NOK1000) of
persons assigned to this GP in 2001
PWEALTH Median wealth (NOK1000) of
persons assigned to this GP in 2001
PFORMSUB Share of persons returning forms in 2001
among those assigned to this GP in 2001
LOSUBMIT log(PFORMSUB/(1-PFORMSUB))
PEDUC Share of persons without finished high-school
among those assigned to this GP in 2001
LOEDUC log(PEDUC/(1-PEDUC))
GPDENSITY No. of GPs per 1000 inhabitans in municipality
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Model B:
y′1 = [ DEMAND ], y′2 =

LOLEAK1
LOLEAK2
LOLEAK3
LOLEAK4
LOLEAK5
LOLEAK6
LOLEAK7
,
x′1 =

SPECGEN
SPECCOM
SPECOTH
SALARY
MARRIED
AGEGP
, x′2 =
[
LOSUBMIT
LOEDUC
PINCOME
]
, x′3 =

EXCMORT1
EXCMORT2
EXCMORT3
EXCMORT4
EXCMORT5
EXCMORT6
EXCMORT7
, x′4 =
[
FEMALEGP
IMMIGRGP
]
Variables at the GP level, including patient stock characteristics
The variables collected at the GP level and related to the mortality of the persons on
the GP’s list are DEAD, EXPDEAD, ACTMORT, EXPMORT, and EXCMORT. The number of
individuals leaving the list and the number of mortalities on each individual GP’s list
during a six-month period is registered in the GP database, except for the year 2002,
where this information is registered for the whole calendar year only. We have allocated
the mortalities and the switches in this year on the two half-years, according to the list
sizes in the two half-years. DEAD denotes the number of mortalities during a period, and
ACTMORT measures mortality per thousand listed patients.
GPs with a relatively high proportion of elderly people on their lists are presumably
recorded with a relatively high mortality rate in any period. In order to compensate for
this heterogeneity when measuring excess mortality, we proceeded as follows: Among the
information registered in the GP database is the number of listed males and females be-
longing to each of the age categories 0–7, 8–19, 20–29, 30–39, 40–49, 50–59, 60–69, 70–79
years, and 80 years and above. By applying the gender and the age specific death proba-
bilities (Statistics Norway, 2005a) and the age distribution in Norway (Statistics Norway,
2005b), we can for each GP calculate the expected number of mortalities, EXPDEAD, and
the expected per thousand mortality rate, EXPMORT, i.e., EXPDEAD per thousand listed
persons. This enables us to calculate EXCMORT: the difference between the actual and the
expected mortality rates at the GP level, henceforth to be referred to as the GP-specific
excess mortality rate
From Table 3 we see that the overall mean of the actual number of mortalities during a
six-month period (DEAD) is 5.63, and from Table 4 that its GP-specific mean ranges from
0 to 22 mortalities. The overall mean of the expected number of mortalities (EXPDEAD)
is 5.12, with range from 0.05 to 23.9. By combining the aggregate death probabilities
and the age-gender distribution of listed patients we have obtained a two-dimensional
variable, with a mean value not far from the actual mean number of deaths according to
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the mortality statistics included in the General Practitioners Database.
Table 3: Global descriptive statistics
Variable Obs Mean St.Dev Skewness Kurtosis Min Max
DEAD 3260 5.6254 4.2566 1.2850 5.3638 0 29
EXPDEAD 3275 5.1252 3.2353 1.1384 4.6549 0.0503 23.9037
ACTMORT 3251 4.7629 3.5683 1.9031 11.9554 0 37.9669
EXPMORT 3256 4.2390 2.1982 0.8033 3.3628 0.3781 13.6722
EXCMORT 3251 0.5235 2.6810 2.2873 17.5835 -8.4804 29.4960
DEMAND 3275 825.9289 520.5296 1.1275 4.8392 21 3152
DEMAND1 3275 716.0950 447.6848 1.1181 4.8671 18.3694 2757.1620
LEAKRATE 3251 0.0290 0.0269 6.2202 108.6469 0 0.6660
AGEGP 3275 47.0293 7.5861 0.0610 2.8225 28 70
FEMALEGP 3275 0.3600 0.4801 0.5833 1.3403 0 1
MARRIEDGP 3275 0.6889 0.4630 -0.8159 1.6656 0 1
IMMIGRGP 3275 0.0504 0.2188 4.1111 17.9015 0 1
SALARY 3275 0.0544 0.2267 3.9315 16.4564 0 1
LISTSIZE 3256 1211.0820 401.3513 0.1665 3.4662 123 2687
SPECGEN 3275 0.5597 0.4965 -0.2405 1.0578 0 1
SPECCOM 3275 0.0696 0.2545 3.3821 12.4389 0 1
SPECOTH 3275 0.0345 0.1825 5.1008 27.0180 0 1
LEASTCENT 3275 0.0256 0.1581 6.0012 37.0144 0 1
LESSCENT 3275 0.0116 0.1071 9.1212 84.1960 0 1
CENTRAL 3275 0.0403 0.1967 4.6747 22.8526 0 1
MOSTCENT 3275 0.9224 0.2675 -3.1588 10.9778 0 1
PINCOME 3275 196.5151 23.7784 0.2245 2.7626 130.9460 261.7615
PWEALTH 3275 63.4333 79.2646 1.2259 4.9701 -94.0780 467.3245
PFORMSUB 3275 0.7320 0.2642 -0.7781 2.5387 0.0554 1.0000
PEDUC 3275 0.4446 0.1524 -0.2344 2.4003 0.0213 0.8090
Table 4: Descriptive statistics for GP-specific means, No. of GPs: 484
Variable Mean St.Dev Skew Kurt Min Max Between variation as
share of total, %
DEAD 5.5612 3.6936 1.1570 4.8702 0.0000 22.0816 75.3
EXPDEAD 5.0638 3.2286 1.2459 5.2236 0.3427 22.6007 99.6
ACTMORT 4.7216 2.9549 1.7391 11.2484 0.0000 28.1421 68.6
EXPMORT 4.2065 2.1513 0.8130 3.3556 0.4489 12.4530 95.8
EXCMORT 0.5151 1.8582 3.3390 30.4057 -4.1782 20.3758 48.0
LEAKRATE 0.0308 0.0255 4.4032 36.3194 0.0007 0.2737 90.2
LISTSIZE 1201.6160 401.2103 0.1835 3.4536 152.7857 2620.0000 99.9 %
The overall mean number of mortalities per thousand listed persons is 4.76. Its GP-
specific means range from zero to 28 deaths per thousand. EXPMORT has an overall mean
of 4.24 deaths per thousand, and the GP-specific means ranges from 0.45 to 12.45. An
important variable in the analyses is the excess mortality rate, EXCMORT. As explained, a
positive (negative) value means that the mortality rate at the GP level is higher (lower)
than expected from the age and gender distribution of the persons on each GP’s list. We
note that the overall mean of EXCMORT is positive. The reason for this could be, on the
one hand that the mortality tables are constructed from cross-sectional variation in mor-
talities during a period of only one year, on the other hand that life expectancy is known
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to be lower than the national average in the municipality Oslo (Statistics Norway, 2006a
& 2006b), which is the location of 426 of the 484 GPs in the data set. A third explanation
may be that the number of deaths in the first period is somewhat overestimated.3
We denote the number of consumers ranking a specific GP as the most preferred GP
as DEMAND directed towards this GP. This variable is time-invariant, as the matching of
GPs and patients has been undertaken only once in connection with the implementation
of the regular GP reform in 2001. The average GP was preferred by 826 inhabitants,
but there is a lot of variation. The most popular GP in our data set was preferred
by 3152 inhabitants, whereas some GPs were not preferred by any inhabitants. Being
requested by a large number of inhabitants in a municipality with a high GP density
is not equivalent to be strongly requested in a municipality where the GP density is
low. We have considered two ways of controlling for differences in GP density across
municipalities. The primary one is to include a measure of GP density as an additional
explanatory variable representing observed heterogeneity. The secondary one is to weight
DEMAND by a measure of GP density. The specific measure of the GP density applied
here is the number of GPs per thousand inhabitants in the municipality (GPDENSITY);
see the next sub-section for an elaboration. The specific measure of weighted demand
we used is the variables DEMAND1, obtained as the product of DEMAND and GPDENSITY.
Taking DEMAND1 as the relevant demand variable in our analysis implies that a given
number of first rankings is interpreted as a higher demand in a municipality with a high
GP density than in a municipality where GP density is low. Prediction [P2] in Section
2 provides the rationale for transforming the demand variable in this way.
We have information on the number of persons leaving a GP’s list in order to enroll
on a competitor’s list.4 We refer to the proportion of listed persons leaving the list and
switching to other GPs in the municipality as LEAKRATE, and interpret this variable as
a time-varying indicator of the demand. Its overall mean is 3%, its GP-specific means
vary from close to zero to 27%, and the between GP variation accounts for as much as
90% of the total variation.
Our data set also reports the GP’s age (AGEGP), gender (FEMALEGP), and marital
status (MARRIEDGP) as well as the GP’s birth country. We see that the average GP is
3The period-specific means of ACTMORT seem to be higher in the first period than in the later
periods. This is not unexpected as the first period is one month longer than the other ones, a fact we
have adjusted for simply by multiplying the number of mortalities in the first period with 6
7
. We suspect
that mortalities in the period April to June 2001 may also have been registered, although with a lag. In
estimating the models, we have therefore alternatively applied an adjustment factor of 6
9
, which would
have been correct if mortalities from April to June 2001 were indeed included among those registered
for the second half-year 2001. The main results are not affected by this modification of the adjustment
factor.
4Patients leaving the list because they migrate or move to another municipality are excluded from
these numbers. We thus interpret LEAKRATE as the proportion of the listed persons who switch because
they actually prefer another GP.
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47 years old, that 36% of the GPs are females and that 69% are married. We have con-
structed a binary variable, IMMIGRGP, equal to 1 if the GP is born in a non-Scandinavian
country. About 5% of the GPs in our sample have this property. The variable denoted
SALARY is a binary variable equal to one if the GP is remunerated by means of a fixed
salary contract when practicing as a GP, and we see that 5% of the GPs have this kind
of contract.
The number of patients actually listed in the practice at the beginning and end of
each period is registered in the GP database. To take account of within-period changes
of this variable, we construct the average of the numbers recorded at the beginning and
at the end of each period, giving the variable LISTSIZE. Its overall mean is 1211 persons,
while its GP-specific means range from 153 to 2620.
Our data set also reports whether the GP is a specialist in general medicine (dummy
variable SPECGEN), in community medicine (dummy variable SPECCOM) or in another
medical field (dummy variable SPECOTH) – all of which are time-varying dummies, but
the within-GP variation is small. Overall, 56% of the GPs are specialists in general
medicine, 7% are specialists in community medicine. and 3% are specialists in an other
field.
Our GP-level data also contain the following information on the patients who were
listed in the practice in June 2001: the median net income and median net wealth among
the listed patients older than 30 years, the proportion of listed patients who are older
than 30 and have not finished high school and the proportion of the listed patients who
submitted the entry form signalling GP preferences. By construction, these variables
are uni-dimensional, as this information is not updated after the implementation of the
regular General Practitioner Scheme. The income and wealth variables, measured in
1.000 NOK, PINCOME and PWEALTH, have overall means 196.5 and 63.4, respectively.
Not unexpectedly, they vary considerably: the GP whose listed patients are on average
richest, have a median income twice that of the GP whose listed patients have the lowest
median income. The corresponding median wealth, PWEALTH extends from −94.2 to
467.3. In the LISREL analysis, after some trial runs, we decided to exclude PWEALTH
from the variable list, in order to ensure convergence. We suspect that the reason for
this is that income and wealth are highly correlated.
Finally, PFORMSUB denotes the proportion of the listed patients who submitted the
entry form prior to the implementation of the regular General Practitioner Scheme. This
variable varies from nearly zero to one, indicating that some GPs were not assigned any
patients who submitted the entry form, while other GPs were assigned only patients who
submitted the form. The mean of this variable is 0.73, indicating that the average GP
have a list where 73% of the patients submitted the entry form. We denote by PEDUC
the proportion of the listed patients who are older than 30 and have not finished high
school. We see that the average GP have 45% of the listed patients characterized by not
having finished high school. This share also varies considerably, from 2% to 81%.
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Variables at the level of the municipality
Some important variables reported are specific to the municipality in which the practice of
the GP is localized. Statistics Norway has constructed an indicator of centrality, placing
each Norwegian municipality in one of 4 centrality categories. This indicator captures,
inter alia, the population density and the distance to the nearest city of a certain size. We
refer to these categories, in an order of increasing centrality, as least central (LEASTCENT),
less central (LESSCENT), central (CENTRAL) and most central (MOSTCENT). In our sample
six municipalities are categorized as least central municipalities, one as being less central,
three municipalities as being central, while three municipalities are categorized as most
central. A description of the GP density measure, GPDENSITY, and the number of GPs
within each municipality are given in Table 5. We see that the range of GPDENSITY is
from 0.55 to 1.57 GPs per thousand inhabitants.
Table 5: Descriptive statistics for variables at the municipal level
Municipality No. of GPs GPDENSITY
Frogn 7 0.69
Oslo 426 0.87
Stor-Elvdal 2 0.68
Søndre Land 5 0.98
Notodden 10 0.82
Tvedestrand 5 0.84
Vindafjord 4 0.83
Os 12 0.86
Jølster 2 1.01
Ulstein 6 0.91
Overhalla 2 0.55
Beiarn 1 1.57
Porsanger 2 0.69
Total 484
5 Estimation and test results
Our data set include several variables expected to be related to the individual quality of
the GP, primarily the demand variable DEMAND and excess mortality variable EXCMORT.
It is important to note that information on the number of patient mortalities at the level
of the GP is not publicly available in Norway. It is thus highly unlikely that individuals’
choice of GP is directly related to these numbers. We derived from our theoretical model
in Section 2, the prediction, [P1], that a positive relationship exists between the quality
of the individual GP and the demand facing the GP, even when individual consumers
may have incorrect perceptions of GP quality. How perceptions are formed is unknown
and we make no attempt to open this “black box”, as an enquiry into the formation of
human perceptions is beyond the scope of this paper. We let consumers be heterogeneous
with regard to their preferences, the information they possess, and the way they process
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information. Consumers may choose the same GP for different reasons, or different GPs
for the same reason. We expect however that the GPs’ appearance, experiences from
earlier consultations with available GPs, advice from relatives and friends and even rumor
to enter the “black box” as inputs in the formation of individuals’ quality perceptions.
As explained in Sections 3 and 4, the statistical modeling of the ‘causality chain’ giving
rise to this relationship is rather different in the two econometric models we consider,
Model A and Model B. In addition, mainly as a robustness check of our main conclusion,
results obtained from a third model, Model C – essentially a modification of Model B in
one important respect – will be briefly considered at the end.
The estimation procedure for Model A, Version 2, represented by Equation (12),
is, as explained in Section 3, a stepwise procedure. Using in both steps modules in the
STATA 9 software, we estimate in the first step the effect of the variables representing
observed heterogeneity and other assumed exogenous variables on the mortality rates and
extract the predicted value of the random effect for each GP in the sample, ALPHAHAT.5
In estimating this mortality equation, i.e., the second equation of (12), we allow for the
possibility that the residuals are not independent within municipalities, and report robust
standard errors. In the second step, this prediction, treated as an exogenous variable, is
inserted in the demand equation, i.e., the first equation of (12). 6
For the multi-equation model, Model B, we apply the Maximum Likelihood (ML)
procedure in the LISREL 8.80 software. 7 The actual number of linear equations to be
simultaneously estimated is 25. In this model both the quality of the individual GPs and
the unobserved aggregate health status of the listed patients occur as latent exogenous
variables, as explained in Section 3.
Results for Model A
The mortality equation
The dependent variable in this equation is ACTMORT. Observable heterogeneity is con-
trolled for in various ways. First, to control for differences in the age and gender dis-
tribution of the GPs’ listed patients, we include the expected mortality rates EXPMORT
as an explanatory variable. Second, to account for heterogeneity between municipali-
5See Hsiao (2003, Section 6.2.2.c) and Lee and Griffiths (1979) on the prediction of random effects
from panel data.
6An even simpler alternative also considered is a single-equation model where the excess mortality
rate is inserted directly as a quality indicator in the demand equation – in a sense merging the two
equations in (12) into one equation. The underlying assumption is that the GP specific level of patient
excess mortality is exogenous. This approach, however, is defective to the extent that the GPs have an
inhomogeneous patient stock with respect to the average health status, which will induce a bias in the
coefficient estimate of the quality variable. The results from this ‘single-equation version’ of Model A is
presented in Appendix A, Table A.1
7The Covariances and Means to be analyzed are estimated by the EM procedure, as there are some
missing observations due to the unbalanced panel data.
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ties of different centrality, we include the centrality dummies LEASTCENT, LESSCENT and
CENTRAL. Third, to account for observable GP heterogeneity we include AGEGP, three
GP speciality dummies as well as FEMALEGP. Fourth, we include variables describing the
listed patients, with intention to control for the possibility that the average health status
of patients varies between GPs. Since there is evidence in the medical literature that
life expectancy and health status is related to education, income and wealth (Lantz et
al., 1998, Papas et al., 1993), we include PEDUC, PINCOME and PWEALTH as proxies for the
average health status of the persons listed with each GP. Fifth, as discussed in Section 2,
still another kind of heterogeneity may also occur: individuals who chose not to submit
the entry form stating their preferences for certain GPs, may have an average health
status different from those who returned the entry form. We take account of this by in-
cluding PFORMSUB as an explanatory variable. Since the range of PEDUC and PFORMSUB
is restricted to the (0, 1) interval, we transform them by the log-odds using the formula
ln( x1−x) in order to extend their range to (−∞,+∞) which gives a better balance with
the unbounded range of the other explanatory variables.
Table 6: Model A. Mortality equation, GLS estimates
No. of obs.=3251. No. of GPs=484. Obs. per GP.: min=1, mean=6.7, max=7
Regressor Estimate Std.Err.
EXPMORT 1.2900 0.0383**
CENTRAL -0.6365 0.1656**
LESSCENT -0.3897 0.0434**
LEASTCENT -0.2359 0.2578
LOSUBMIT -0.0496 0.0025**
LOEDUC -0.0468 0.0185*
PINCOME -0.0097 0.0015**
PWEALTH -0.0094 0.0006**
SPECGEN 0.0156 0.0323
SPECCOM 0.2164 0.0536**
SPECOTH -0.6432 0.0717**
FEMALEGP -0.1720 0.0422**
AGEGP -0.0547 0.0498
AGEGPSQ 0.0003 0.0005
CONST 4.0038 1.0395*
σα2 1.3602
σu2 2.1076
ρ 0.2940
R2
within 0.0578
between 0.7104
overall 0.5071
Wald chi2(11) 165868
p-value 0.0000
∗) Significantly 6= 0 at the 5% level (two-tailed test)
∗∗) Significantly 6= 0 at the 1% level (two-tailed test)
The results from the mortality equation are presented in Table 6. All of the es-
timated coefficients except LEASTCENT, SPECGEN, AGEGP and AGEGPSQ are statistically
significant, and the overall R2 is rather high: 0.5071. The coefficient of EXPMORT is pos-
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itive, as expected, since high expected mortality should have a positive effect on actual
mortality. Further, GPs having their practice in a central or less central municipality
have a significantly lower patient mortality rate than GPs in most central municipalities.
The negative estimated coefficient of LOSUBMIT indicates that GPs who were assigned
a high proportion of the persons who expressed their GP preferences in advance, have
lower patient mortality than GPs who obtained a low proportion of patients who actively
selected their GP. The coefficient on the education variable is negative, which is not in ac-
cordance with intuition saying that GPs with a high proportion of low-educated patients
have a higher mortality rate and may be attributed to education being correlated with
income and wealth.8 The estimated coefficients of income and wealth have the expected
negative signs. Since these variables are measured in 1000 NOK, an increase in PINCOME
and PWEALTH of NOK 100.000 would be accompanied by a reduction in the mortality
rates of 0.97 and 0.94 deaths per thousand, respectively. We see that, ceteris paribus, the
patient mortality rate of GPs who are specialists in community medicine is significantly
higher and that of GPs who are specialists in a field other than general medicine and
community medicine is significantly lower than the patient mortality rate of other GPs.
Finally, female GPs have, ceteris paribus, a lower mortality rate of their patient stock
than male GPs.
Statistics describing the predicted values of the GP specific heterogeneity variables,
i.e., of the α2js obtained from the second equation of (12), denoted as ALPHAHAT, are
given in Table 7. According to our interpretation of Model A, α2j represents a latent
variable that is linearly related to quality, confer Equations (7) and (10). A histogram is
given in Figure 1. Its form is not very far from a bell-shape, although with an outlier at
the right end, equal to 13.11 deaths per thousand.
We next proceed to consider the results for the demand equations, in which the AL-
PHAHAT predictions are among its explanatory variables.
Table 7: Model A: Predicted Quality indicator Alphahat. Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean St.Dev Skew Kurt Min Max
ALPHAHAT 0.0000 1.1546 3.5900 37.5611 -3.3982 13.1143
The demand equation
The estimation results for the demand equation, in the two versions explained above, are
presented in Table 8. In panel A, to which we will give most attention, the dependent
variable is DEMAND. Supplementary results, to investigate the sensitivity of the findings,
8This intuition is supported by supplementary regressions in which income and wealth were excluded
as regressors, giving a significantly positive coefficient of LOEDUC.
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Figure 1: Histogram of ALPHAHAT
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when applying the GP density weighted measure of demand, DEMAND1, are given in
panel B. In panel A, the GP density is included as a explanatory variable instead.
Explanatory variables included in both versions of the equation are the specialization
dummies, SPECGEN and SPECOTH, which may be interpreted by the market as observable
quality indicators. We also include the specialization dummy SPECCOM. We expect this
variable to have a negative effect on demand. One reason for this may be that GPs
who are specialists in community medicine are known to participate more frequently in
the community health service than GPs who do not have this specialization (Godager
and Lur˚as, 2007), and as a result, they may supply fewer business hours per week and
hence appear less attractive for patients. To take account of observable GP heterogeneity
we in addition include dummy variables MARRIEDGP, IMMIGRGP and FEMALEGP, as well
as AGEGP as explanatory variables. Because the demand variable is time invariant, cf.
the first equation of (12), weighted between-GP estimation is used, the weighting be-
ing motivated from the differing number of observations behind the GP-specific means.
The GP density has a statistically significant effect on demand, and its coefficient has
the expected negative sign (Table 8, Panel A). Second, the estimated coefficient of AL-
PHAHAT is negative and statistically significant – supporting the intuition that increased
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Table 8: Model A: Demand equation: Between GP estimates
No. of obs.=3251. No. of GPs=484. Obs. per GP.: min=1, mean=6.7, max=7
A. Demand measure: No. of first rankings, DEMAND
Regressor Estimate Std.Err.
GPDENS1 -950.3971 445.4716*
MARRIEDGP 144.8451 48.7506**
SPECGEN 158.4471 54.4290**
SPECCOM -156.025 90.4873
SPECOTH -159.9245 125.6506
ALPHAHAT -66.018 19.1214**
IMMIGRGP -114.8588 104.0845
FEMALEGP -89.3546 48.5764
AGEGP 82.8435 29.0487**
AGEGPSQ -0.8065 0.3023**
CONST -545.2106 824.6051
R2
within 0.0000
between 0.1403
overall 0.1372
F (10, 473) 7.72
p-value 0.0000
B. Demand measure: No. of GP density weighted first rankings, DEMAND1
Regressor Estimate Std.Err.
MARRIEDGP 124.3429 42.1185**
SPECGEN 140.2252 46.9876**
SPECCOM -136.4362 78.0651
SPECOTH -134.8392 108.5775
ALPHAHAT -56.6003 16.5214**
IMMIGRGP -95.0004 89.9192
FEMALEGP -75.4430 41.9200
AGEGP 72.4525 24.9295**
AGEGPSQ -0.7066 0.2595**
CONST -1204.6690 586.5191*
R2
within 0.0000
between 0.1298
overall 0.1265
F (9, 474) 7.86
p-value 0.0000
∗) Significantly 6= 0 at the 5% level (two-tailed test)
∗∗) Significantly 6= 0 at the 1% level (two-tailed test)
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quality induces increased demand facing the GP. Furthermore, the estimated effect of
MARRIEDGP and SPECGEN indicate that being married and being a specialist in general
medicine contribute, ceteris paribus, to a higher market demand. While FEMALEGP is
not statistically significant, AGEGP comes out with a positive and statistically significant
effect. The latter results may be explained by the fact that a GP’s age is correlated
with the number of years in GP practice, and that a GP who has been practicing for a
long time may be included in the choice set of a larger proportion of the consumers in
the market. This mechanism, however, is not explicitly accounted for in our theoretical
model. It would have been possible to capture it by introducing heterogeneous groups
of consumers with different choice sets within the same market, and this can be done
simply by furnishing the parameter N with a group subscript.
As to the signs of the effects as well as their significance, the results in Panel B are
very similar to those in Panel A. Being married and being a specialist in general medicine
are both estimated to have a positive effect according to this model as well, and again,
AGEGP comes out with a significantly positive coefficient.
Results for Model B
The path diagram produced by the LISREL program, given in Figure 2, is a useful
starting point for the description of the approach. As explained in Section 3, the LISREL
model consists of two parts: the measurement equations and the structural equations,
representing the relationship between the latent variables. In the sequel, we will follow
the conventional LISREL notation, letting latent variables be indicated by names having
capitalized first letter, whereas observable variables are written without capitalized first
letters.9 The measurement model specifies how our unobserved, latent variables Quality,
Health and Demand are indicated by observed variables; cf. equations (16) and (15).
By modeling the demand facing the individual GP as a latent variable we are able
to utilize information on the rate at which patients leave the GP’s list in order to join a
competitor’s list. This approach thus takes into account how the demand facing the GPs
has developed after the introduction of the General Practitioner Scheme. In our case the
measurement model consists of two parts. The measurement equations for the exogenous
latent variables, in the LISREL notation in Section 3 referred to as ξ-variables, are
henceforth referred to as the X-measurement model. The measurement equations for the
dependent latent variable, in LISREL notation referred to as an η-variable, is henceforth
referred to as the Y -measurement model. When interpreting the approach and the results
below, it should be recalled that the panel structure of the data – including the repeated
observations of patients leaving the GP’s list as well as of the excess mortality rates at
the level of the GP – is essential for obtaining the inference we want to make, as the
three latent variables in focus on Model B, Quality, Health and Demand, are all time
9We denote the variables Femalegp and Immigrant as if they were latent. See note 1.
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Figure 2: LISREL Path diagram, Model B
invariant.10 In total, Model B comprises 25 equations that are simultaneously estimated
by the Maximum Likelihood (ML) method. We start by presenting the results from
10As explained in Section 4, the observations from period 2 and 3 are linearly dependent by construction.
Therefore observations from period 2 are excluded from the data set when estimating Model B.
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estimation of the structural equation before presenting the results from the estimation
of the equations in the two measurement models.
The structural model (demand equation)
The results from estimation of the structural equation, corresponding to Equation (14)
in Section 3, are given in Table 9. Our first major finding is that the estimated effect
Table 9: Model B: Equation for latent demand. Coefficient estimates
No. of obs.=484.
Regressor Estimate Std.Err.
Quality 1.3583 0.1617**
Health 0.0456 0.0177**
Femalegp -1.0422 0.3881**
Immigrant -0.9545 0.8356
∗) Significantly 6= 0 at the 5% level (two-tailed test)
∗∗) Significantly 6= 0 at the 1% level (two-tailed test)
of Quality on Demand is statistically significant and has the expected sign. Since the
measurement scale of Demand is the number of first rankings measured in hundreds,
the interpretation of the coefficient estimate of 1.36 obtained is that a marginal increase
in Quality, equivalent to a marginal reduction in the excess mortality rates, increases
Demand by 136 persons. Second, we find that the estimated coefficient of Health also is
statistically significant with a positive sign, which implies that the more healthy a GP’s
patients are, for a given level of quality, the higher demand will be experienced. Also,
the estimated coefficient of Femalegp is negative and statistically significant.
We remember from Section 2 that heterogeneity of patients ability or willingness
to collect and process available quality information may induce selection mechanisms
resulting in systematic differences in morbidity and mortality between GPs with different
levels of quality. We have no prior knowledge of the direction in which this selection
mechanism may go. However, failing to control for differing aggregate health status of
listed patients is likely to result in a simultaneity bias and/or an excluded variable bias
when estimating the effect of quality on demand. Our approach separates the effect of
quality on excess mortalities from the effect of health at the level of the GP through the
exclusion restrictions imposed on the measurement equations for Quality and Health: six
variables describing the GP are included in the measurement equations for Quality, but
excluded from the measurement equations for Health, while three variables are included
in the measurement equations for Health but excluded from the measurement equations
for Quality.
The estimated covariance matrix of the latent variables is given in Table 10. Our
results indicate that there is a negative association between Quality and Health. What
we observe is thus consistent with a situation where a selection mechanism exists such that
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Table 10: Model B: Variance and correlation matrix of latent variables
Variances along the main diagonal, correlation coefficients below the diagonal. No. of obs.=484.
Demand Quality Health
Demand 15.6585
Quality 0.4358 2.4438
Health 0.0123 -0.4064 460.2335
GPs with low quality of services are endowed with a patient stock with a better health,
as compared to GPs with higher quality of services. One may argue that Model B does
not reveal the effect of the GPs’ quality on the initial health state of listed patients, as
it is set up to measure the effect of quality when controlling for initial health status of
patients showing between GP variation. To address the latter issue, and for the purpose
of conducting a robustness check of our main findings, we have additionally estimated
an alternative LISREL model where all latent variables enter as η variables, i.e., as
formally endogenous – Quality and Health being exogenous latent variables in Model B.
Such a model setup allows the estimation of the marginal effect of GP’s quality on the
initial state of health. The results from this model, denoted as Model C, are reported in
Appendix A. The results confirm the results from Model B, that latent quality affects
latent demand positively. The numerical size of the effect is somewhat smaller, however.
The most important single result from estimation of Model C is that quality is found not
to have significant effect on the aggregate health status of the GP’s listed patients.
The X-measurement model
The left hand side of Figure 2 describes the relations in the X-measurement model.
Arrows indicate the relation between the observable variables and the ξ variables, and
the reported numbers on each arrow corresponds to the estimated or fixed ’factor load-
ing‘.Since latent variables by definition do not have a scale of measurement, the scale of
the latent variables are defined by fixing one or more of the factor loadings. In order
to make the results from LISREL estimation comparable to the results of the previous
model we have scaled the ξ variable Quality to be measured in (negative) units of per
thousand excess mortality rates. By fixing the factor loading of pincome on Health, we
have scaled the ξ variable Health to be measured in units of thousand Norwegian kro-
ner. Note that the arrows representing the fixed factor loadings are shaded compared
to the massive arrows representing estimated factor loadings. Although formally treated
as latent variables, the ξ-variables Femalegp and Immigrgp are identical to their observ-
able counterparts femalegp and immigrgp. This is done by fixing the factor loadings to
unity and fixing the error terms in the two corresponding regression equations to zero.
The interpretation is that the GP’s gender and country of birth is expected to affect
the demand directly, without being indicators of either quality or health status of listed
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patients. The excess mortality rate from each period is entered as indicators of GP qual-
ity and as indicators of the aggregate measure of health status of listed patients. Other
variables included as indicators of quality are dummy variables indicating GP special-
ization, a dummy variable indicating whether or not the GP is remunerated by means
of a fixed salary, a dummy variable indicating whether or not the GP is married and
the GP’s age. The proportion of listed individuals without finished high school and the
proportion of listed individuals who submitted the entry form in 2001 are included as
indicators of the aggregate health measure. The results from estimation of the equations
in the X-measurement model, corresponding to Equation (16) in Section 3, are given in
Table 11. The estimated factor loading of Quality on married, agegp and specgen1 are
Table 11: Model B: X-measurement equations
No. of obs.=484.
ξ variable Quality Health
Dep var Estimate Std.Err. Estimate Std.Err.
excmort1 -1 (Fixed) -0.0614 0.0127**
excmort3 -1 (Fixed) -0.0498 0.0121**
excmort4 -1 (Fixed) -0.0581 0.0123**
excmort5 -1 (Fixed) -0.0458 0.0120**
excmort6 -1 (Fixed) -0.0673 0.0127**
excmort7 -1 (Fixed) -0.0445 0.0119**
loeduc 0 (Fixed) -0.0283 0.0025**
losubmit 0 (Fixed) 0.0374 0.0158*
pincome 0 (Fixed) 1 (Fixed)
femalegp 0 (Fixed) 0 (Fixed)
immigrgp 0 (Fixed) 0 (Fixed)
married 0.0558 0.0161** 0 (Fixed)
agegp 1.0471 0.2692** 0 (Fixed)
salary1 0.0033 0.0079 0 (Fixed)
specgen1 0.0658 0.0174** 0 (Fixed)
specoth1 -0.0056 0.0064 0 (Fixed)
speccom1 0.0056 0.0086 0 (Fixed)
∗) Significantly 6= 0 at the 5% level (two-tailed test)
∗∗) Significantly 6= 0 at the 1% level (two-tailed test)
statistically significant, and the interpretation is that married GPs, GPs that are spe-
cialists in general medicine is associated with higher quality and that there is a positive
relation between GP age and provided quality. We see that all the factor loadings of
Health is statistically significant, and we see that excess mortality rates are negatively
related to Health. We see that Health is positively related to the share of individuals
who submitted the entry form in 2001, and that our latent aggregate health measure
is negatively related to the proportion of listed individuals with short schooling, as ex-
pected. The estimated covariance matrix of error terms in the X-measurement model
is given in Table 12. We have added some restrictions on the correlation of error terms
from different x-regressions. With some exceptions error terms from different regressions
are uncorrelated. Error terms in regressions on the quality indicators related to GP
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Table 12: Model B: Error covariance matrix of X-measurement equations
excmort1 excmort3 excmort4 excmort5 excmort6 excmort7
excmort1 0.7120
excmort3 0.1371 0.6403
excmort4 – 0.0727 0.6520
excmort5 – – -0.0077 0.6397
excmort6 – – – -0.1060 0.6625
excmort7 – – – – 0.0046 0.6026
loeduc pincome losubmit salary1 married agegp specgen1 specoth1 speccom1
loeduc 0.2931
pincome – 0.1951
losubmit – – 0.9866
salary1 – – – 0.9995
married – – – – 0.9648
agegp – – – – – 0.9550
specgen1 – – – – – – 0.9575
specoth1 – – – – – – -0.0043 0.9979
speccom1 – – – – – – 0.1463 -0.0082 0.9988
specialization, specgen1, specoth1 and speccom1 are allowed to be correlated. Further,
error terms on in the excess mortality rates regression from period t are allowed to be
correlated with error terms in period t−1.
The Y -measurement model
The right hand side of Figure 2 describes the relations in the Y -measurement model.
Here the observable variable demand1 enters the model as an indicator of the η variable
Demand. The variable demand1 is identical to the GP density weighted number of first
rankings applied in estimation of Model A. The factor loading of Demand on demand1 is
fixed to 100 and the η variable Demand is thus measured in units of hundred first rankings.
Table 13: Model B: Y -measurement equations
No. of obs.=484.
η variable Demand
Dep var Estimate Std.Err.
loleak1 -0.1671 0.0165**
loleak3 -0.1542 0.0167**
loleak4 -0.2337 0.0759**
loleak5 -0.1600 0.0465**
loleak6 -0.2541 0.0899*
loleak7 -0.0850 0.0494
demand1 100 (Fixed)
∗) Significantly 6= 0 at the 5% level (two-tailed test)
∗∗) Significantly 6= 0 at the 1% level (two-tailed test)
30
The log-odds-ratio of the proportion of listed persons leaving the list in period t, loleakt,
are entered as indicators of Demand. The results from estimation of the equations in the
Y -measurement model, corresponding to Equation (15) in Section 3, are given in Table
13. We see that all the estimated factor loadings are statistically significant, and that the
factor loadings of the loleakt variables and the factor loading of Demand on demand1 are
of opposite sign, as one should expect. The estimated covariance matrix of error terms in
the Y -measurement model is given in Table 14. No restrictions are specified with regard
to the structure of this matrix.
Table 14: Model B: Error covariance matrix of Y -measurement equations
loleak1 loleak3 loleak4 loleak5 loleak6 loleak7 demand1
loleak1 0.4024
loleak3 0.2469 0.4318
loleak4 0.1819 0.2454 0.9014
loleak5 0.2058 0.2489 0.5517 0.8818
loleak6 0.1312 0.1983 0.3027 0.4874 0.9123
loleak7 0.2182 0.2768 0.1667 0.2079 0.1671 0.9673
demand1 -0.0235 0.0049 -0.0101 -0.0394 0.0359 -0.0858 0.2182
6 Discussion and conclusion
Our analysis supports the hypothesis that the demand responds to the individual quality
of the GP. Even though our two different approaches to quantifying this effect rely on
different assumptions and different methods, it may be argued that our two sets of results
pointing in the same direction, contribute to strengthening this conclusion. Our results
indicate that a marginal quality increase equivalent to a reduction of the mortality rate
of one per thousand – being the implicit measurement scale of our quality indicator –
increases the demand facing the GP by 57 persons according to Model A and by 136
persons according to Model B. In interpreting this finding one should recall that the
empirical results for Model A (presented in Section 5), rely on Version 2 from Section 3,
which imposes an asymmetry in the way quality affects latent GP-specific heterogeneity
in the two equations. The estimators used under Model A, although enjoying consistency
under Version 2, are inconsistent if the less restrictive Version 1 is valid.
The latter has been our primary motivation for also modeling latent heterogeneity
within a LISREL framework. Our LISREL model, Model B, may be considered less
restrictive than Model A and also enables us to address more appropriately the issue that
the aggregate health status of listed patients, also considered an unobservable variable,
is likely to be related to the mortality rates at the level of the GP.
We believe that this econometric modeling tool has a wider application in assessing
the impact of quality of health care providers on demand for health services than the one
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presented here. Our LISREL model separates the effect of quality on outcome measures
from the effect of patient health at the provider level through the exclusion restrictions
imposed on the measurement equations for the latent variables Quality and Health. An
idea for future research is to apply this modelling and estimation strategy to matched
hospital-patient data, in order to measure the impact of hospital quality on demand.
An important question from the point of view of policy implications is: how strong is
the effect of quality on demand? In the context of regression models answers to such
questions are often provided by means of appropriate elasticities. Due to the fact that the
mean value of latent variables are undefined, the elasticities of interest, such as Quality
elasticity of demand are also undefined. However, to get a ‘metric’ for assessing the
magnitude of the effect we may compare the effect of quality on demand with the effect
of the observable GP specific variables like the GP gender dummy and the dummy for
whether or not the GP is born in a non-scandinavian country. In case of model B, this
can be achieved by utilizing the standardized solution of our LISREL estimation in which
all effects are scaled in terms of their standard deviation. The standardized solution thus
obtained indicates that the effect of quality on demand is more than four times the effect
of the GP gender dummy and ten times the effect of non-Scandinavian GP dummy. It
is also illuminating to interpret the latter effect in relation to the standard deviation
of the Quality variable σQ (confer Table 10). We then find that an increase in quality
equivalent to a reduction of the patient mortality rate by one per thousand corresponds
to a change in Quality equal to 0.6397σQ. An increase of this order of magnitude results
in an increase in Demand corresponding to 16% relative to the global mean of DEMAND,
given in table Table 3.
References
Arrow, K.E. 1963. Uncertainty and the welfare economics of medical care. American Economic Review
53, 941-973.
Aigner, D.J., Hsiao, C., Kapteyn, A., and Wansbeek, T. (1984): Latent Variable Models in Economet-
rics, in Griliches, Z. and M.D. Intriligator (eds.): Handbook of econometrics, vol. II, Amsterdam:
North-Holland, 1321-1393.
Burns, L.R. and Wholey, D.R. (1992): The Impact of Physician Characteristics in Conditional Choice
Models for Hospital Care. Journal of Health Economics 11, 43-62.
Chirikos, Thomas N.(1992): Quality Competition in Local Hospital Markets: Some Econometric Evi-
dence from the Period 1982-1988. Social Science & Medicine 34, 1011-1021.
Dranove, D. and Satterthwaite, M.A., (2000): The Industrial Organization Of Health Care Markets, in
A.J. Culyer and J.P. Newhouse (eds.): Handbook of Health Economics, vol.1. Amsterdam: Elsevier
Science, pp. 1093-1139.
Gaynor, M. (2006): What Do We Know About Competition And Quality In Health Care Markets?
NBER working paper No. w12301. National Bureau of Economic Research.
Godager, G.(2008): Consumer Choice and Patient Selection in Health Care: Evidence From the Reform
in Norwegian General Practice. Unpublished working Paper.
Godager, G., and Lur˚as, H. (2007): Dual Job Holding General Practitioners: The Effect of Patient Short-
age. Unpublished working Paper.
32
Goldberger, A.S. (1972): Structural Equation Methods in the Social Sciences. Econometrica 40, 979-1001
Howard, D.H. (2005): Quality and Consumer Choice in Healthcare: Evidence from Kidney Transplanta-
tion. Topics in Economic Analysis & Policy.
Hsiao, C. (2003): Analysis of Panel Data, Second edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Jo¨reskog, K.G. (1977): Structural Equation Models in the Social Sciences: Specification, Estimation and
Testing, in P.R. Krishnaiah (ed.): Applications of statistics. Amsterdam: North Holland, pp. 265-287.
Jo¨reskog, K.G., D. So¨rbom, D., du Toit, D. and du Toit. M. (2000): LISREL 8: New Statistical Fea-
tures. Lincolnwood, IL: Scientific Software International.
Lantz et al. (1998): Socioeconomic Factors, Health Behaviors, and Mortality. Results From a Nationally
Representative Prospective Study of US Adults. The Journal of the American Medical Association
279,1703-1708
Lee, L.F., and Griffiths, W.E. (1979): The Prior Likelihood and Best Unbiased Prediction in Stochastic
Coefficient Linear Models. Working Papers in Econometrics and Applied Statistics No. 1. Depart-
ment of Economic Statistics, University of New England.
Luft, H.S. et al. (1990): Does Quality Influence Choice of Hospital? Journal of the American Medical
Association 263, 2899-2906.
Lur˚as, H., Paulsen, B. and Finnvold, J.E. (2003): De fleste fikk den de ville ha. (In Norwegian.) Sam-
funnsspeilet 05/2003.
Ma, C.T.A. (1994): Health Care Payment Systems: Cost and Quality Incentives. Journal of Economics
and Management Strategy 3, 93-112.
Papas G., et al. (1993): The Increasing Disparity in Mortality Between Socioeconomic Groups in the
United States, 1960 and 1986. The New England Journal of Medicine 329, 103-109.
Statistics Norway (2005a): Dødelighetstabeller 2004. (In Norwegian.) Oslo: Statistics Norway.
http://www.ssb.no/emner/02/02/10/dode/arkiv/tab-2005-04-28-05.html.
Statistics Norway (2005b): Folkemengde, etter kjønn og ett˚arig alder. (In Norwegian.) Oslo: Statistics
Norway. http//:statbank.ssb.no/statistikkbanken.
Statistics Norway (2006a): Indeks for levek˚arsproblemer og delindekser for enkeltindikatorer
http://www.ssb.no/vis/emner/03/hjulet/tabell-04.html
Statistics Norway (2006b): Alders- og kjønnsstandardisert dødelighet. Gjennomsnitt for a˚rene 2001-2005.
Dødelighet per 100 000 innbyggere. Konfidensintervall for dødelighetsraten
http://www.ssb.no/emner/03/hjulet/tabell-08.1.html
Appendix A: Excess mortality exogenous in demand equation
The estimation results when excess mortality rates at the level of the GP is entered as an exoge-
nous explanatory variable are presented in Table A.1, panel A based on the dependent variable
DEMAND, panel B on the dependent variable DEMAND1. The only difference between the results
presented in Table A.1 and the results presented in Table 8 is that ALPHAHAT is replaced by
EXCMORT. The latter variable is now assumed to be a valid proxy for quality, and is assumed
to be uncorrelated with the error components. We see that the estimated effect of GP density
is statistically significant and has the expected sign. We see that being married and being a
specialist in general medicine have a positive and statistically significant effect on demand. We
also see that AGEGP has a statistically significant effect. The effect of EXCMORT is negative and
statistically significant. An interpretation may be that a marginal increase in quality, measured
in terms of a reduction in the excess mortality rates, increase the demand facing the GP. The
magnitude of the estimated coefficient indicates that a marginal quality increase equivalent to a
reduction of the mortality rate of one per thousand, increases the demand facing the GP by 90
persons (Panel A). We note that the estimated coefficients on EXCMORT are larger in absolute
value as compared to the coefficients on ALPHAHAT in Table 8. An interpretation of this result,
while recalling that the dimension of the coefficients are the same, is that by representing quality
by EXCMORT, as in Table A.1, we disregard the variation in health status between GPs. We
cannot assess whether high excess mortality is a result of low quality or bad health status of the
listed patients.
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Table A.1: Model A: Between GP estimates of demand equation.
No. of obs.=3251. No. of GPs=484. Obs. per GP.: min=1, mean=6.7, max=7
A. Demand measure: No. of first rankings, DEMAND
Regressor Estimate Std.Err.
GPDENS1 -922.5879 424.9770*
MARRIEDGP 113.9111 46.7327*
SPECGEN 150.8321 51.9366**
SPECCOM -156.9416 86.3357
SPECOTH -182.0114 119.8388
EXCMORT -90.6113 11.7378**
IMMIGRGP -119.6318 99.2157
FEMALEGP -133.5571 46.6809**
AGEGP 72.0700 27.7608**
AGEGPSQ -0.7207 0.2887*
CONST -167.7292 788.7412
R2
within 0.0000
between 0.2172
overall 0.1408
F (10, 473) 13.12
p-value 0.0000
B. GP density-weighted no. of first rankings, DEMAND1
Regressor Estimate Std.Err.
MARRIEDGP 97.3718 40.3584*
SPECGEN 133.7817 44.8165**
SPECCOM -137.5563 74.4515
SPECOTH -153.7605 103.5101
EXCMORT -78.5167 10.1394**
IMMIGRGP -99.4600 85.6771
FEMALEGP -113.5944 40.2677**
AGEGP 62.9205 23.8148**
AGEGPSQ -0.6302 0.2478*
CONST -851.8743 561.5582*
R2
within 0.0000
between 0.2084
overall 0.1323
F (9, 474) 13.87
p-value 0.0000
∗) Significantly 6= 0 at the 5% level (two-tailed test)
∗∗) Significantly 6= 0 at the 1% level (two-tailed test)
Appendix B: Alternative LISREL model. Model C
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Figure B.1: LISREL Path diagram, Model C
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Table B.1: Model C: Equations for latent dependent variables.
Coefficient estimates. No. of obs.=484.
Regressors
Quality immigrant married agegp femalegp
Dep var Est. Std.Err. Est. Std.Err. Est. Std.Err. Est. Std.Err. Est. Std.Err.
Demand 0.9759 0.1487** -1.2020 0.7935 1.2539 0.3748** 0.0293 0.0226 -0.6711 0.3733
Health -0.0019 0.0019 0 (Fixed) 0 (Fixed) 0 (Fixed) 0 (Fixed)
∗) Significantly 6= 0 at the 5% level (two-tailed test)
∗∗) Significantly 6= 0 at the 1% level (two-tailed test)
Table B.2: Model C: Variance and correlation matrix of latent variables
Variances along the main diagonal, correlation coefficients below the diagonal. No. of obs.=484.
Quality Demand Health
Quality 2.1382
Demand 0.3426 17.3484
Health -0.1268 -0.0434 0.0005
Table B.3: Model C: Y -measurement equation
No. of obs.=484.
Regressors
Quality Demand Health
DEP VAR Estimate Std.Err. Estimate Std.Err. Estimate Std.Err.
demand1 0 (Fixed) 100.0000 (Fixed) 0 (Fixed)
loleak1 0 (Fixed) -0.1576 (0.0178)** 0 (Fixed)
loleak3 0 (Fixed) -0.1650 (0.0186)** 0 (Fixed)
loleak4 0 (Fixed) -0.3930 (0.0598)** 0 (Fixed)
loleak5 0 (Fixed) -0.2673 (0.0392)** 0 (Fixed)
loleak6 0 (Fixed) -0.4151 (0.0663)** 0 (Fixed)
loleak7 0 (Fixed) -0.2038 (0.0339)** 0 (Fixed)
speccom1 0.0016 (0.0092) 0 (Fixed) 0 (Fixed)
specoth1 -0.0046 (0.0069) 0 (Fixed) 0 (Fixed)
specgen1 0.0452 (0.0181)** 0 (Fixed) 0 (Fixed)
salary1 0.0055 (0.0085) 0 (Fixed) 0 (Fixed)
excmort1 -1.0000 (Fixed) 0 (Fixed) -39.3361 (9.9107)**
excmort3 -1.0000 (Fixed) 0 (Fixed) -28.0050 (9.1767)**
excmort4 -1.0000 (Fixed) 0 (Fixed) -35.8985 (9.4614)**
excmort5 -1.0000 (Fixed) 0 (Fixed) -24.0063 (9.1388)**
excmort6 -1.0000 (Fixed) 0 (Fixed) -44.6527 (9.8519)**
excmort7 -1.0000 (Fixed) 0 (Fixed) -23.3650 (9.0128)**
pincome 0 (Fixed) 0 (Fixed) 1000.0000 (Fixed)
pwealth 0 (Fixed) 0 (Fixed) 439.5965 (174.5656)**
loeduc 0 (Fixed) 0 (Fixed) -26.9137 (2.5591)**
losubmit 0 (Fixed) 0 (Fixed) 37.1699 (15.3537)**
∗) Significantly 6= 0 at the 5% level (two-tailed test)
∗∗) Significantly 6= 0 at the 1% level (two-tailed test)
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Table B.4: Model C: Error covariance matrix in subsystem for Y -measurement
demand1 loleak1 loleak3 loleak4 loleak5 loleak6 loleak7
demand1 21999.3356
loleak1 9.7168 0.2958
loleak3 51.4310 0.1182 0.1773
loleak4 283.0998 – 0.0333 5.9740
loleak5 174.9324 – – 1.5528 2.0378
loleak6 339.9960 – – – 1.4497 8.5124
loleak7 153.7280 – – – – -0.1123 2.7219
excmort1 excmort3 excmort4 excmort5 excmort6 excmort7
excmort1 6.2133
excmort3 1.0092 3.9033
excmort4 – 0.3908 4.4066
excmort5 – – -0.1208 3.8241
excmort6 – – – -0.8207 5.1367
excmort7 – – – – -0.0872 3.2198
speccom1 specoth1 specgen1 salary1 pincome pwealth loeduc losubmit
speccom1 0.0635
specoth1 -0.0005 0.0358
specgen1 0.0191 -0.0009 0.2444
salary1 – – – 0.0544
pincome – – – 87.6548
pwealth – – – – – 6131.2983
loeduc – – – – – – 0.1696
losubmit – – – – – – – 47.5383
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